Philosophy Post #4: The Problem with Philosophical Experience - A Talk

Here is the transcript of a talk I have prepared on Étienne Gilson’s The Unity of Philosophical Experience. 

Please feel free to offer thoughts and comments via email 

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 The Problem with Philosophical Experience - A Talk

A Talk Inspired by Feser and Gilson

 

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Hello everyone, and welcome.

Today I want to respond to Edward Feser’s recent commentary on Étienne Gilson’s The Unity of Philosophical Experience. Feser’s piece is, in many ways, a good example of the problems with Scholasticism. It may be recalled that Scholasticism was the dominant philosophy of Europe not merely for years but for centuries. From what I understand, Étienne Gilson’s The Unity of Philosophical Experience outlines how various philosophers throughout history have attempted to reduce metaphysics to narrower disciplines—like logic, physics, or epistemology—and how, in doing so, they’ve created intellectual dead-ends. And while I have you here, why don't enjoy this beautiful photograph from outer space?

Moving on. It’s an elegant argument. But I think something’s missing—not just in Gilson’s thesis, but in Feser’s uncritical embrace of it.

Let’s take a closer look at Feser’s treatment of Peter Abelard. Scholasticism paints the Bible as the inerrant word of God, and Gilson paints Abelard as a figure who reduces metaphysics to mere logic. According to this view, Abelard’s project is an early example of philosophy losing its grounding—an attempt to substitute rigorous reasoning for metaphysical depth.

But that strikes me as far too simplistic.

What neither Gilson nor did Aquinas do is fully engage with is the context in which Abelard was writing. Abelard wasn’t just some rogue logician; he was operating within a deeply theological milieu. He was trying, like many Scholastics, to reconcile faith and reason—to find coherence within the doctrines of Christianity using the tools of logic and philosophy.

So when Abelard appears to be “reducing metaphysics to logic,” it’s not some abstract methodological error. It’s part of a larger, tortured effort to make religious belief philosophically respectable. And to critique him without acknowledging that broader intellectual pressure is to miss the point entirely.

Here’s the irony, though: Edward Feser is not a disinterested historian of philosophy. He himself is deeply embedded in a Catholic metaphysical worldview. He affirms the existence of the soul. He defends natural law. He upholds the Thomistic framework.

And that means he is bound by the same theological premises that shaped the thinkers he critiques.

This is where things get really interesting—because if you’re too committed to a tradition, it becomes harder to see its limitations. You might criticize Abelard, or Descartes, or Kant, but only within the bounds of a worldview you refuse to question.

That’s what I think is happening with Feser’s take on Gilson. He’s not able to ask the deeper question: What if the real problem wasn’t that metaphysics was reduced to logic, but that metaphysics itself had become overly entangled with theology to begin with? What if the Scholastic project—so beloved by Feser—was flawed at the root?

As people of the Twenty First Century not beholden to any religious tradition, I feel that we should feel freer to ask that kind of question. I can appreciate the historical richness of Scholasticism while still seeing how its foundations—rooted in theological dogma—constrain philosophical inquiry.

Let me be clear: I don’t think Abelard’s ethics are wrong in a factual sense. On the contrary, it’s often quite illuminating and one can even find a sense of fraternity with the values he is trying to inspire. The same may be said of Thomas Aquinas, and indeed, even Edward Feser. But Feser’s reading of philosophical history is warped by a longing for metaphysical certainty—a kind of nostalgia for the ordered cosmos of medieval thought. And that makes it hard for him to fairly evaluate what modern thinkers were actually trying to do.

So, in closing: Gilson’s Unity of Philosophical Experience could well be worth reading for its historical sweep. But we should be wary of how thinkers like Feser use that history. Because sometimes, what appears to be a deep philosophical insight is actually a defense mechanism—a way to avoid confronting the very uncertainties that make philosophy so powerful in the first place.

Thank you.

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